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Abstract 
This paper proposes a model in which the removal of barriers to trade and factor mobility is 
associated with endogenous fragmentation of the value-added chain. Fragmentation is the 
outcome of cost competition – the profit-maximizing choice of cost structure by 
monopolistically competitive firms. An expansion of the integrated trading area can induce 
globalization not only in the horizontal dimension associated with love-of-variety preferences, 
but also vertically as firms vary specialization of production stages. While increased trade is 
likely to induce fragmentation when the number of firms is fixed, free entry can either reverse 
or intensify this result. 
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1. Introduction 
 At the outset of the new millennium, usage of the term "globalization" has become so 
extensive that it risks trivialization. While a precise definition of globalization remains elusive 
in both academic and popular discussion, one defining aspect must be the leap in economic 
integration of the world's economies over the last few decades; in the OECD, the ratio of 
international trade to value added rose from 24.6 percent in 1960 to 42.7 percent in 1996 
(OECD (1998)). Yet many observers have noted that on this metric, the world is no more 
integrated today than it was at the turn of the last century; one frequently reads of 
"globalization cycles" in economic history.1 
 The causes of globalization today appear to be fundamentally different, however, to 
those at the dawn of the last century. We are witnessing a wave of fundamental developments 
which are changing ways that nations interact economically with each other. Mega-mergers 
and cross-border firm linkages have intensified trade in intermediate goods. An especially 
impressive development has been the rise in outsourcing, which allows firms to extend 
activities across national boundaries and tailor manufacturing strategies to idiosyncratic 
attributes of local production sites. The word "fragmentation" has been used to characterize 
these developments (e.g. Deardorff (1998); Jones/Kierzkowski (1990; 1997; 1999); Feenstra 
(1998); Kierzkowski (1998)). 
 At the same time, a large and growing body of research confirms that the intensification 
of trade is best characterized as vertical rather than horizontal. Krugman (1995) points out that 
export to GDP ratios exceeding 30 percent can only be explained by reference to vertically 
linked trade. This applies in particular to countries with total trade exposure exceeding total 
economy value added. At the level of the OECD, Yeats (1998) estimates that the share of 
trade in parts and components within the SITC 7 category (i.e. machinery and transportation 
equipment) increased by 4 percentage points between 1978-95 and currently stands at more 
                                                             
1 See Bairoch (1989), Rodrick (1998), Williamson (1998), Baldwin/Martin (1999). 
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than 30 percent; he considers these numbers as representative for manufactured goods in 
general. Yeats' estimates, based on recent revisions of trade statistics, are in line with 
estimates by Campa/Goldberg (1997), who examined input-output data of 20 industries on the 
2-digit SIC level from the UK, the US and Canada and found that in almost all industries the 
imported share of inputs (in total inputs) rose in the period 1975-95. Looking at the share of 
imported inputs in exports, Hummels/Rapoport/Yi (1998) found similar evidence.2 
 This aspect of globalization is the focus of our paper. In particular, we ask the question: 
under what circumstances and to what extent can the opening up of trade itself account for the 
increasing fragmentation of world economic relations? In the model we propose below, 
fragmentation is driven by Smithian division of labor and pure economies of scale, and results 
from cost competition among firms. To highlight these effects, we exclude any exogenous 
variation in technology from our analysis.3 
 Globalization of this sort can differ considerably from that derived in models of 
horizontal trade alone. North-South models of the HOS or Ricardian type are often difficult to 
reconcile with product and labor market developments in industrialized countries.4 
Endogenous changes in production methods, rather than low wage competition, are 
responsible for an increase in the relative demand for skill in our model. For further emphasis, 
we focus our attention on fragmentation in an integrated economy, bypassing for the moment 
physical trade flows to emphasize the endogeneity of production and cost structures. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief review of the literature on 
fragmentation and trade. Section 3 proposes our model of endogenous fragmentation in an 
                                                             
2 The same pattern of increases in outsourcing and intra-industry trade in components is also displayed by 
area and industry studies (Ng/Yeats (1999); Jones/Kierzkowski (1999)). 
3  For a discussion of globalization related to intermediates production and outsourcing driven by factor 
proportions and Ricardian differences, see Sanyal/Jones (1982), Sanyal (1983), Feenstra/Hanson (1996a,b), and 
Deardorff (1998)); outsourcing related to factor intensities of multinationals is discussed by Slaughter (1999)). 
4 It has proven difficult to explain recent labor market developments in OECD countries. An overwhelming 
majority of studies from the perspective of both trade volumes (Sachs/Shatz (1996), Cooper (1994), but see also 
Wood (1994)) and prices (Lücke (1998)) have found little evidence of globalization along HOS-lines. The 
predicted pattern of substitution from skilled towards unskilled labor stands in contrast to actual developments: 
in particular in the US, the unskilled-skilled ratio fell in virtually all industries (Berman/Bound/Machin (1998)). 
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integrated economy and illustrates the central role of the labor market in determining the 
resource cost of fragmentation, which we interpret as the production of business services. As 
the impact differs depending on whether one adopts a short-run or a long-run perspective we 
will distinguish between two model variants: one with a fixed number of firms and another 
with free entry. Section 4 reinterprets the model as a benchmark integrated economy and 
presents the central comparative statics results linking the size of the trading area to 
globalization as we understand it in this paper. Because the model allows for trade in 
differentiated final goods, it permits the useful distinction between globalization in horizontal 
and vertical dimensions. An important finding is that while increased trade is likely to induce 
technological change in the form of fragmentation in the short run (when the number of firms 
is fixed) free entry can either reverse or intensify this result. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A Review of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
 A number of contributions have featured the fragmentation of production processes as a 
concomitant phenomenon of globalization (see Francois (1990a,b), Jones/Kierzkowski (1990; 
1997; 1999)). In general, these models abstract from opportunity costs of resources employed 
in managing the fragmented value added chain. Jones/Kierzkowski (1990) emphasize the role 
of producer services in the fragmentation of production process without a formal model. In 
Jones/Kierzkowski (1997), specialization in intermediates is driven by stages of production 
and endowments (see also Feenstra/Hanson (1996a,b)). Drawing on the examples of the 
photo-imaging and pharmaceutical industries, Jones/Kierzkowski (1999) describe how 
fragmentation allows sharing of production blocks across various industries and how 
indivisibilities and economies of scope increase complementarities between horizontal 
linkages among industries and vertical specialization. 
 Francois (1990a) explicitly accounts for services and employs a family of production 
functions as developed by Edwards/Starr (1987) to display economies of scale as 
 5
fragmentation is increased, but features a single (homogeneous) labor market. Most 
importantly, he stresses the endogeneity of the elasticity of substitution in demand along the 
lines of Lancaster (1979), so that demand and market size drive fragmentation (see also 
Dluhosch (2000)). In a related paper, Francois (1990b) assumes that services are produced 
with high skilled labor only while direct production uses unskilled labor but retains Lancaster 
preferences in demand, which he considers crucial for fragmentation (see Francois 
(1990b:723, fn. 6)). 
 Another salient aspect of models studying horizontal and vertical trade as globalization 
is the assumption of Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) "love-of-variety" preferences (Krugman (1980; 
1981), Helpman (1981)). In principle, trade in these models is driven by the demand-side as 
well. Because consumers prefer greater variety of goods, larger markets sustain larger 
numbers of businesses; in equilibrium, competition occurs via the number of firms, not via the 
scale of production.5 Love of variety in intermediates may feature increases in productivity 
and scale in final goods production, but in the end this process is demand-driven as well. 
Some examples of this approach are Markusen (1989); Feenstra/Markusen/Zeile (1992); 
Feenstra/Markusen (1994); Krugman/Venables (1995); Ethier (1982) and Romer (1987).6 
 Our model shifts focus from demand to supply as an alternative engine of globalization. 
We model fragmentation as an endogenous choice of cost-competitive firms in a general 
equilibrium setting with two factors of production. The scale of production of individual firms 
changes endogenously, while the production process becomes more fragmented and global 
sourcing increases. In our framework, labor markets turn out to be crucial for integration-
driven fragmentation. Business services produced with skilled labor are necessary for 
managing global production and therefore determine the equilibrium extent of fragmentation. 
Explicit modeling of the supply side of fragmentation is a central contribution of our model.  
                                                             
5  Krugman (1981) addresses this issue by assuming differentiated products segmented on the demand-side 
along industry groups. 
6  On labor market implications in particular see also Matusz (1996). 
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3. Cost Competition and Technological Choice under Monopolistic Competition in 
the Closed Economy 
 
3.1. Household Preferences and Demand 
We consider an economy populated by identical households which consume a large number N 
of differentiated, manufactured goods in quantities xi as well as a homogeneous consumption 
service good x0, which serves as the model's numeraire. Preferences over manufactured goods 
are described by the standard Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) symmetric CES function, which is nested 
in turn in Cobb-Douglas utility with expenditure shares of m and (1-m) for manufactured 
goods and consumer services, respectively. Given income Y, utility maximization gives rise to 
the familiar demand functions 
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so that for N large, the elasticity of demand for manufactured goods is approximately h. 
 
3.2. Manufactured Goods and Technology of Cost Reduction 
Each of the N differentiated manufactured goods is produced by a single monopolistically 
competitive firm. A central innovation in this paper is that the supplier of each variety can 
influence its own costs by choosing the length or roundaboutness of production, and thereby 
the degree of specialization of individual production stages. This aspect of technology is 
summarized by a positive real number z. Since we allow for noninteger values, it is best to 
think of z as an index of fragmentation or specialization of stages in the value added chain.7 A 
small increase in fragmentation or specialization dz (or an incremental lengthening of the 
                                                             
7 Since our model refers primarily to industry or economy-wide phenomena and not to the firm, ignoring the 
integer problem should not be an important issue.  
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production process) reduces direct production costs, but also generates additional fixed costs 
pzdz, so pz is the cost of adding and managing an intermediate production stage.  
 Direct production costs of x units of the manufactured good consist of direct fixed 
costs F >0, and direct variable costs v(z)x which are subadditive over the z stages, so that total 
direct production costs for a representative firm are given by ( )xzvF + , with v'<0, v''>0. This 
formulation is consistent with Adam Smith's (1776) idea that the size of the market 
determines the extent to which specialization increases productivity and reduce variable 
costs.8 To facilitate analysis, we assume an isoelastic form ( ) gz
v
zv =  with 
( )1
1
0
-
<<
h
g .9 
Total production costs for firm i are then given by 
 iZi
i
zpx
z
v
F ++ g . (2) 
 
3.3. Optimal Firm Behavior and Partial Product Market Equilibrium 
Because they deliver fundamentally different results, we distinguish two cases of partial 
product market equilibrium. In the first case, the market for manufactures is served by a fixed 
number of established firms in what might be regarded as a short-run analysis. The second 
case adopts a long-run perspective and assumes free entry, so that all economic profits are 
competed away. In this section we derive the generic partial product market equilibrium 
which we later specialize to the two different market situations.  
 Profits of the representative firm in manufacturing can be written as the difference 
between total revenues and total production costs: 
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8  Fixed costs might also be affected by choice of z, but in the end it is relative cost differences that are crucial 
and these can be captured by focusing on variable costs. 
9 This implies that marginal costs at z=0 are infinite, so demand for z will be strictly positive. The explicit 
bounds on g are necessary to prevent fragmentation from being "too efficient" in cost reduction. 
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Since firms produce differentiated goods with identical technologies, describing (partial) 
product market equilibrium without entry is straightforward. The ith firm maximizes profit 
given by (3) by its choice of output level xi and cost reduction zi, taking pz and its output 
demand curve (1a) as given. Combining the first order conditions (not shown) with the 
symmetry of manufactured goods in utility and production, we have pi=pj=p, xi=xj=x and 
zi=zj=z for all firms i and j. For a given N , it follows that  
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Equations (4a-c) convey a number of implications of cost competition in partial equilibrium:  
§ production fragmentation z depends negatively on the costs of fragmentation, pz and 
positively on total income Y;  
§ the price of manufactured output p (in terms of consumer services) depends positively on 
pz and negatively on Y, while marginal costs are now endogenous; 
§ the scale of the firm x depends both on aggregate income Y as well as incentives and 
ability of firms to reduce costs (pz relative to Y).  
 To enforce consistency of the cost function with a primal problem in two factors of 
production, we assume that direct production costs of manufacturing firms represent 
payments for the output of a perfectly competitive intermediate sector which employs skilled 
labor HP and unskilled labor LP using the constant returns production function f(HP,LP) and 
sells its output at price pC.10 
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3.4. Business Services  
The partial equilibrium analysis of the last section treated the price of business services pz and 
aggregate income Y as given. If Z (=Nz) is produced by profit-maximizing firms using 
resources with value in alternative uses, this is assumption is clearly vulnerable.11 To complete 
the model, it is necessary to incorporate explicitly the supply of labor to business services and 
the other two productive sectors, consumer services and manufacturing production. In this 
way we can pin down the equilibrium aggregate supply of business services Z and its relative 
price pz, and by extension, the extent of firm-level fragmentation z. 
 Irrespective of whether they involve geographical reallocation of industries, the 
fragmentation of production absorbs resources in the form of additional coordination and 
communication capacities, as well as middle management, sales and legal personnel. These 
resource requirements are modeled explicitly as a demand for business services produced with 
skilled labor. It is here that the link between fragmentation and the labor market is 
established.12 By suitable normalization, the length of the production process z of the 
representative firm gives rise to an equal demand for business services, which can be 
interpreted as an intermediate input to manufacturing. Economy-wide demand for business 
services Z is thus given by Nz: 
  NzZ = . (5) 
 Business services are supplied in quantity Z by perfectly competitive, profit-maximizing 
firms using skilled labor HS and the constant returns production function  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
10 We assume that f has the usual properties; that is, fH , fL >0; fHH, fLL <0; fLH>0; and fHH fLL-( fLH)
2=0. 
Alternatively, the intermediate can be thought of as the output of a manpower industry which is outsourced by 
manufacturing firms.  
11 In the original work of Kennedy (1964), Samuelson (1965) and von Weizsäcker on factor bias of 
technological change, these resource requirements were not explicitly modeled. 
12 Some of these channels have been stressed by Harris (1995). Becker/Murphy (1992) point out that the 
division of labor is more often determined by costs of coordinating the various activities rather than size of the 
market. Our formulation is consistent with the fact that average compensation in business services is higher than 
in the overall economy while skill premia are on the rise (OECD 1999). The referee has pointed out that z might 
simply represent firm investments in specific human capital. This alternative interpretation would fail to account 
for the strong concentration of recent employment growth in administration and management observed in OECD 
countries (Burda/Dluhosch (1999)). 
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  SAHZ =   (6) 
with A>1. The market price of business services in terms of the numeraire pz is taken as given, 
so the derived demand for labor in this sector is infinitely elastic at Apz which will be the 
equilibrium wage in the economy for skilled labor.  
 
3.5. Consumer Services  
Competitive firms produce consumer services using unskilled labor with a constant returns 
technology  
  SLx =0  (7) 
so labor demand in this sector is infinite elastic at real product wage of unity. As with 
business services, the assumption that consumer services are produced with low-skilled labor 
is driven by the fact that compensation in that sector is generally below average (OECD 
(1999)). 
 
3.6. Labor Market Equilibrium 
Households supply labor inelastically in two forms, skilled H and unskilled L . Labor 
markets are segmented by skill level; they are assumed to clear, and mobility between 
alternative uses (sectors) is costless; the demand curve for each type of labor in each sector is 
the "supply price" to the other. It follows that two equilibrium conditions are the equality of 
wage and value marginal product for both types of labor:  
  ),(1 SSLC LLHHfp --=  (8) 
  ( )SSHCz LLHHfpAp --= , , (9) 
where pC is the market price of the intermediate input which constitute the direct costs to the 
manufacturing sector.  
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3.7. Closing the Model in the Short Run: No Entry  
Since the general equilibrium impact of the size of the trading area depends on whether we 
assume free entry of firms or not, we distinguish two situations: one in which we allow firms 
to make profits, and another in which a zero profit condition is imposed. We now characterize 
first the equilibrium outcome when the number of firms is fixed at`N. 
 To close the model we require two output market equilibrium conditions. The first 
concerns the market for business services (Z), equating demand of N  firms given by (4c) and 
(5) with total market supply given by (6): 
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p
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gmh 1
 (10) 
 The second equilibrium condition is that the value of demand for direct cost input of 
manufacturing firms must equal production:  
 [ ] ( )SSC LLHHfpxzvFN --=+ - ,g  (11) 
 
With the number of firms fixed at N , (1b), (4a), (4b), (4c), (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) are nine 
equations in x0, x, z, p, pz, pC, Hs, Ls, and Y. By virtue of its recursive structure, the model can 
be reduced to the following system of three equations in Ls, Hs, and pz,: 
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Since the right hand side of equation (14) represents total direct costs in manufacturing valued 
in terms of the numeraire, the left hand side can be interpreted as its allocation into fixed FN  
and equilibrium variable 
( )
( ) SLmh
mh
-
-
1
1
 components. 
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3.8. Closing the Model in the Long Run: Free Entry  
 In case of free entry, an additional zero profit condition is imposed on the system (4a-c). 
Profits are driven to zero by endogenous variation in product variety and the number of firms, 
both given by N.13 Setting (3) to zero and substituting (4) yields the following relationship 
between product variety N and income Y: 
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It is now clear that in order for positive equilibrium market size, equation (15) requires 
( ) 110 <-< hg , which we have already assumed above. Combining (15) with (4a-c) yields the 
following symmetric product market equilibrium conditions with free entry: 
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With free entry, partial product market equilibrium can be characterized exclusively in terms 
of pz. Note now that:  
§ due to free entry and replication, aggregate income Y as well as the fraction spent on 
manufactures by consumers, m, are irrelevant for the partial product market outcome;  
§ in contrast to Dixit/Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1980, 1981), the equilibrium scale of the 
firm x is not constant under free entry, but depends on the cost of fragmentation (pz). From 
(16a), x becomes constant as g goes to 0, as in Krugman (1980, 1981);  
                                                             
13  Again, we ignore integer issues here.  
 13
§ from (16b), the equilibrium price manufactured output p (in terms of consumer services) 
depends positively on pz only. As g approaches zero, the markup converges to the familiar 
Lerner index of monopoly power (see Lerner (1934)); 
§ an increase in market power of the representative firm (a decline in h) reduces both the 
output of firms and expenditures on cost reduction unambiguously.14 
§ the share of fixed and variable costs in direct costs at the optimum is constant.15  
 
 Under free entry, the model consists of the same system as that without entry plus the 
zero profit condition (15). As before, it can be reduced to a system of three equations in three  
unknowns Ls, Hs, and pZ: 
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4. International Trade, Fragmentation and Globalization  
4.1. Interpreting the Model in Terms of Trade and Globalization 
Until now the model could be thought of as a closed economy in which fragmentation of 
production occurred only in the home country. However, two important aspects of 
international trade can be captured. Like conventional trade approaches, the current model 
predicts that an enlargement of the trading area can have real effects on production patterns.  
                                                             
14  To see this, note that  
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 Generally, two nations that open up to international trade and produce as an integrated 
economy could potentially produce twice as many differentiated products goods or even 
more; horizontal globalization means that the representative household can augment the 
variety of its consumption basket via purchases of "foreign" goods.16 Trade in conventional 
models with differentiated goods has been used to explore the effects of opening up closed 
economies of similar development to trade (e.g. Brander (1981), Krugman (1980, 1981)). 
Since Dixit-Stiglitz preferences presume a boundless appetite for variety, the number of 
available goods will increase if determined endogenously. 
 Yet as pointed out in the introduction, a dramatic increase in trade in intermediate inputs 
and a secular fragmentation of the value-added process, associated with "global sourcing," has 
proceeded at the same if not at a faster pace than world trade (Campa/Goldberg (1997)). 
Therein lies the role of the cost reduction technology: increasing intra-industry trade increases 
incentives of firms to achieve higher volumes by investing in production sites and thereby 
economizing on variable costs; according to (5), the equilibrium effect on N is potentially 
indeterminate if profits are competed away because of entry. In our framework, vertical 
globalization will reflect the process by which the fragmentation of production is achieved 
within and across international boundaries. The distinction between deepening (vertical) and 
broadening (horizontal) globalization is an important one.17  
 There are at least two ways to relate these two dimensions of globalization to trade. One 
is to employ the Samuelsonian metaphor (Samuelson (1949)) and ignore national boundaries; 
it would be sufficient to study the effects of exogenous changes in factor endowments on the 
integrated economy.18 The next step would be to model trade explicitly and ask whether the 
                                                             
16 Admitting only intraindustry specialization, our framework is somewhat special; it is explicitly rigged to 
produce answers that are not related to the factor proportions model of trade, which has not fared well in 
explaining North-North trade in any case (Lücke (1998)). 
17This paper thus extends the analysis of Krugman's (1980), who seems to be arguing that scale effects are 
impossible in a constant elasticity world (p. 200). In our model, optimal scale can differ across different zero 
profit equilibria as firms “economize” on variable costs to varying degrees. 
18This is in line with the widely-held view that intensifying trade has resulted from declining trade barriers (see 
Wood (1994)). 
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integrated economy can be replicated as has been done in the intra-industry trade literature 
(see Helpman's (1984) paper in the Handbook of International Trade). If some goods are not 
traded, however (i.e., services), there is no guarantee that the integrated economy can be 
achieved. In this paper we restrict our analysis to the first approach. 
 Our model predicts that an enlargement of the trading area – achieved for example by 
the removal of barriers to trade and mobility between countries – will have two effects. First, 
a horizontal effect reflected in the number of firms in manufacturing (N) of the traditional 
intra-industry sort. Second, however, an enlarged market for a given trading region, ceteris 
paribus, will increase incentives for individual firms to economize on variable costs by 
outsourcing or fragmenting the production process (z). In this sense, an enlarged market 
associated with trade drives an endogenous evolution of technology, which in turn affects the 
international division of labor.19 There is, however, no reason to believe a priori that 
increased trade will necessarily lead to more fragmentation. In fact, our model suggests that 
while fragmentation increases in the short run, it could be reversed in the long run as firms 
face competition from newly entering firms. In the next section we explore formally in a 
comparative statics analysis the conditions under which a larger trading area in the integrated 
economy will increase the degree of fragmentation of the representative firm, z. 
 
4.2. The Effects of an Enlarged Trading Area: No Entry  
 
 As emphasized in Section 3.3, a variable of central importance to the model economy 
is the price of business services pZ – the market price of fragmentation. From equations (4a)-
(4c), it determines the degree of vertical versus horizontal globalization via its influence on 
the demand for fragmentation at the individual firm level (z), the relative price of 
manufactured goods (p) and the optimal scale (x). In general equilibrium, pZ will be 
influenced by the technology of business services as well as the opportunity cost of skilled 
                                                             
19 This possibility has been discussed in the context of outsourcing by Feenstra (1998).  
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labor in the manufacturing sector, and will thus depend on the elasticity of substitution 
between skilled and unskilled labor as well as employment opportunities of unskilled labor. 
Only with the help of formal comparative statics analysis is it possible to show under which 
conditions globalization of production related to fragmentation increases due to an increase in 
the size of the trading area only. 
 We model the enlargement of markets as an exogenous increase in factors of 
production: HLH ˆˆ,0ˆ w=>  with w ³ 0. The case of w = 1 corresponds to an equiproportional 
increase in both factors; i.e. a simple up- or downscaling of the absolute size of the economy. 
In what follows, we identify conditions under which cost competition leads to vertical 
globalization of production – an increase in the number of production sites for the 
representative firm (dz > 0), rather than merely an increase in the number of products (dN > 
0). Naturally, an increase in fragmentation for the aggregate economy is possible either via an 
increase in firm-level fragmentation or an increase in the number of firms.  
 Using standard notation from Jones (1965), we let lij be the share of labor input 
iÎ{high-skilled (H), low-skilled (L)} employed in jÎ{production (P), services (S)}, let qij be 
the elasticity of f with respect to i (with qHP+qLP=1) and the local elasticity of substitution of f 
as 
ff
ff
HL
HLºs . Log-differentiation of (12), (13), and (14) yields the following system of three 
equations in SLˆ , SHˆ , and Zpˆ  for a given number of firms in manufacturing:
20  
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20 Details on these and other derivations in this paper can be found in an appendix available from the authors. 
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where carats (e.g. xˆ  for dx/x) denotes percentage changes and
( )
( )
( )
( ) úû
ù
ê
ë
é
+
-
-
-
-
=
FN
L
L
S
S
S
mh
mh
mh
mh
1
1
1
1
 stands for 
the equilibrium fraction of variable costs in total direct costs in manufacturing. 
 Equation (20) expresses the evolution of three central variables – unskilled employment 
in consumer services, skilled employment in business services and the price of business 
services in terms of the numeraire – as a function of a small change in the size of the market. 
To repeat, the skill composition of this market enlargement is parameterized by w: if w = 0, 
the trading area experiences an increase of skilled labor only; w = 1 corresponds to the case of 
an equiproportional increase in both factor endowments; w > 1 denotes the case in which 
growth in the supply of unskilled labor exceeds that of skilled workers. 
 Solution of the model involves a straightforward application of Cramer's Rule to (20). It 
is necessary to establish the sign of the determinant DN, which is given by 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )[ ] þ
ý
ü
î
í
ì
+-+-+
--+-+--
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sllqsqll
llqllsqll
ll
s
S
S
LPHPHPHPLPHP
LPHPHPLPHPHPHPLP
LPHP
N 11
1111
 (21) 
A sufficient condition for DN<0 is that the share of variable costs in direct manufacturing is 
sufficiently high, or S>qHP. Another is ( )( ) 01 ³-- HPLP lls , which is fulfilled if direct 
manufacturing is skill-intensive and substitution between skilled and unskilled labor is 
limited. The necessary and sufficient condition for DN<0 can be expressed as  
    
( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) LPHPLPHP
HPHPLPLPHPHPS
lslll
slllsllq
+-
+-----
>
1
111
  (22) 
which is likely to hold for conventional parameter values, even for small s. The intuition is 
that incentives to substitute fixed for variable costs as measured by S (the share of variable in 
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total costs) must be sufficiently large. For the rest of the paper, we will assume that this 
condition holds.  
 
Skilled and Unskilled Employment in Services 
 The response of employment in the two service sectors to an expansion of size of the 
trading area (as parametrized by the endowment of inelastically supplied labor) is of central 
importance in this model. Equilibrium fragmentation will depend on how labor markets 
allocate labor to alternative uses; in particular, on how much high skilled labor is employed 
by the business services sector.  
 The solution of (20) yields the following log differential change in employment of low-
skilled labor in services ( SLˆ ): 
 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ][ ]
HL
NHPLP
HPHPHPHPLPHP
S
ˆ111ˆ s
ll
wlsqqsqllw
D
-++-+--=  (23) 
 
so a sufficient condition for positive SLˆ  is s ³1. The necessary and sufficient condition is  
   
( )HPHPHPLP qwlql
ws
-+
->
1
1  (24) 
which is met for plausibly small s and w. For example, any w fulfilling 
( )HPHP
HPLP
ql
ql
w
--
>
11
 
will work for all admissible values of s. 
 The logarithmic change in high skilled employment in business services is given by  
  
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )
H
SS
H
HPLPN
LPHPHPHPHPLP
S
ˆ111ˆ s
ll
lwlqsqsql
D
-+-+-++--=  
 ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ][ ]HS HPHPHPLPLPLP
NHPLP
ˆ11 qsqwllsll
ll
s ----++-
D
-=   (25) 
The necessary and sufficient condition on s  for positive SHˆ  is  
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( ) ( )
( )[ ]HPHPHPLP
LPHPLP SS
wlqql
lwlls
-+
-+-+->
1
11
1   (26) 
which is met even for some large values of w, i.e. for some 
HP
LP
l
l
w > . 
 To summarize, the model predicts a bimodal increase in both high- and low-skill 
services employment and is thus consistent with current developments in OECD-countries. A 
requirement for this result is a sufficiently large elasticity of substitution between skilled and 
unskilled labor in the manufacturing sector, with the critical value being strictly less than 
unity, the Cobb-Douglas case.  
 
Fragmentation and Market Price of Business Services  
 With the number of firms fixed, the extent of firm-level fragmentation (vertical 
globalization) can be derived directly from aggregate fragmentation ( NZz /= ). Since 
Z=AHS, firm-level fragmentation increases in response to an expansion of the trading area as 
long as HS increases, the conditions for which were established above. Equivalently, 
inspection of (4c) reveals that the necessary and sufficient condition for firm-level vertical 
globalization is ZpY ˆˆ >  or, since LS=(1-m)Y, zS pL ˆˆ > . Thus, it is possible in the short run 
for the price of fragmentation to rise even while fragmentation at the level of the firm is 
increasing. The comparative statics result for zpˆ  is 
  
( ) ( ) ( )
H
S
p
NHPLP
HPLPLPHP
z
ˆ11ˆ s
ll
lwllwl
D
-+----=  (27) 
To sign (27) unambiguously, it is convenient to express parameter restrictions in terms of w. 
With DN<0, the price of fragmentation will rise in short-run equilibrium without entry if and 
only if  
  
( )
( )S
S
HP
LP
--
-->
11
11
l
lw  (28) 
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It is worth remarking that if both conditions (26) and (28) are met, an increase in the trading 
area not only leads to an increase in fragmentation and its market price, but also raises the 
skilled wage (pZA), increases income inequality and induces an apparent skill bias in 
manufacturing, if the business service sector is included.21 In contrast to the usual Heckscher-
Ohlin logic, a relative increase in the world supply of skilled labor (w<1) could lead to an 
increase in its relative wage and an increase in relative manufacturing employment, even 
though manufacturing uses skilled labor less intensively than business services. 
 
4.3. The Effects of an Enlarged Trading Area: Free Entry 
 In the long run, the existence of economic profits or losses induces entry or exit from 
the industry. Log-differentiating the system of equations (17), (18), (19) we obtain the 
following system, in matrix form, setting 0ˆ =A : 
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Again we can calculate equilibrium changes of our three central variables. Note that the 
determinant of the matrix in (29), DF, is now given by  
 
                                                             
21 This result is in line with empirical evidence on the impact of trade on productivity (see Cortes/Jean (1997)).  
For a model in which technology can cause trade and widening skill differentials see Burda/Dluhosch 
(1999). 
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which is unambiguously negative.  
 
Skilled and Unskilled Services Employment 
 With free entry of firms in manufacturing, the evolution of employment of low-skilled 
workers in services SLˆ  is given by : 
  
( ) ( ) ( )[ ][ ]
HL
FHPLP
HPHPHPHPLPHP
S
ˆ111ˆ s
ll
wlsqqsqllw
D
-++-+--=  (31) 
which differs from the short run (no-entry) outcome only due to different values D in the 
denominator. Since the determinant is larger in the free entry case, the increase in consumer 
services is unambiguously smaller in the long run than in the short run.  
 The effect of an increase in factor endowments on the employment of skilled labor in 
business services ( SHˆ ) has the same sign as the resulting change in total fragmentation (since 
SHZ ˆˆ = ), and can be derived as 
  ( ) ( )( )[ ]HH HPHPLPLPLP
FHPLP
S
ˆ)1(11ˆ sqwllsll
ll
s ---++-
D
-=  (32) 
 For an enlargement of the trading area to induce an increase in aggregate business 
services employment and output, it is sufficient that( )( ) 01 >-- swll HPLP . Given DF <0, a 
necessary and sufficient condition on s is22  
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which is strictly less than unity.  
                                                             
22 The analogous condition on w: ( )( )HPHP
HPLP
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w
-
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<
1
11 . 
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 A comparison of necessary and sufficient conditions for no-entry (S<1) versus free-
entry versions (S=1) of the model is illuminating. For growth in business services 
employment in the short run, it is sufficient for 
( )
( )[ ]HPHPHPLP
LPHPLP SS
wlqql
lwll
s
-+
-+-+
->
1
1)1(
1 , so the 
restriction is stricter in the long run if ( ) 11)1( >-+-+ LPHPLP SS lwll  or HPLP llw /> , i.e. if 
the relative increase in endowments exceeds the ratio of low- to high-skilled employees in 
direct manufacturing. Put somewhat differently, the sign of SH S ¶¶ /ˆ  in the no-entry case has 
the same the sign as LPHP lwl - . 
 To summarize the effects of the market size on employment: an increase in factor 
endowments expands unskilled service employment if the endowment of low skilled workers 
increases sufficiently. The interval of s for which both Ls and Hs increase under free entry is 
given by the interval ( ) úû
ù
çç
è
æ
¥÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
-+
- ,0,
1
)1,min(
1max
HPHPHPLP wlqql
w
, which includes the Cobb-
Douglas case, and if w is not too small, also includes econometric estimates for the 
manufacturing sector as well (see Hamermesh (1993)).  
 
Market Price of Business Services and Fragmentation 
The relative price of business services pZ – the price of coordinating fragmented production 
processes – is a central variable of interest. If pZ declines in the long run, then the 
representative firm will have a larger scale of production and be more globalized: 
  
( )
Hp
FHPLP
z
ˆ1ˆ s
ll
w
D
--=  (33) 
Thus in the long run a necessary and sufficient condition for an increase in firm-level 
fragmentation is 1<w . If 1>w , the long run is characterized by an increase in the price of 
and a decrease in the extent of fragmentation. 
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Since the variables in the differentiated goods sector depend only on zpˆ , it follows 
directly from (16c) that fragmentation in the long run may be fundamentally different from 
the short run. In particular, firm-level fragmentation will rise with free entry if and only if 
growth in the endowment of low skilled workers is outstripped by that of high skilled 
workers. In the short run, in contrast, fragmentation may occur with an increase in wage 
inequality as well as an increase in skill intensity in manufacturing. From (26) and (33) one 
could easily imagine a situation in which a uniform expansion of the trading area initially 
induces an increase in business services employment and fragmentation as well as wage 
inequality, all of which are reversed as new firms enter the market.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The objectives of this paper were two-fold: first, to model general equilibrium implications of 
cost competition and fragmentation in a monopolistic competition environment, and second, 
to determine whether trade could explain recent global trends in fragmentation and apparent 
skill bias in domestic labor markets. In the model studied here, trade and fragmentation are 
driven by the size of the market. Increased openness puts pressure on firms to cut costs, and 
as different production techniques are associated with different cost structures, firms in fact 
compete by choice of production method. The result may be a finer vertical division of labor 
and outsourcing similar to that observed in the process of globalization. 
In our analysis, the impact on fragmentation depends crucially on the time horizon 
under consideration. When the number of firms is constant, the removal of barriers to trade 
and mobility induces firms to use more fragmented production structures. This is because 
total value added increases endogenously by more than the market price for business services. 
If the expansion of the trading area is biased sufficiently towards unskilled labor, the process 
of globalization of production may be associated with bimodal growth in high- and low-
skilled employment in services. In stressing cost competition, we offer a potential trade 
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explanation for labor market developments which differs from the traditional account of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. Globalization implies a shift in relative labor demand 
which can reverse the usual effects implied by the Rybczynski Theorem. In a long-run 
perspective characterized by free entry, however, these can be either reversed or intensified, 
depending on the relative change in factor supplies. In any case, our model may be interpreted 
as providing reasons why fragmentation can occur even when factor prices are equalized.23 
 The model lends itself to a number of extensions, including a more thorough 
investigation of the effect of trade on wages.24 A role for diminishing returns in services was 
ruled out in this paper, yet may be an aggravating factor in creating income inequality. 
Overall, the possibility that technological change in the process of globalization is in part 
induced may explain why trade and technology are empirically difficult to disentangle in their 
contribution to the immizeration of low-skilled labor in industrialized countries. A 
comparison of the consequences of expanding trade with those of exogenous technical change 
is an obvious extension, on which we have already reported preliminary results 
(Burda/Dluhosch (1999)). 
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